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“Screening” New York’s New 
Rules—Laterals Remain 
Conflicted Out 
 
Fallyn B. Reichert* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
You happened to be one of the lucky attorneys who got 
hired at a big New York City law firm before the economic 
crisis, but recently found yourself among the many that are 
laid off and looking for a new job at another firm. A potential 
employer is interested, but after submitting the vast list of 
cases and clients that you have actively worked on, it declines 
to hire you because of a conflict of interest that it is unwilling 
to risk. This problem is real and alive more today than ever 
before. New York failed to address this problem in its recently 
adopted ethics rules that do not include a provision allowing for 
the use of screens for laterally moving attorneys. 
Unfortunately, this leaves the state‟s law firms and courts with 
no clear standard to follow and hampers the mobility of lateral 
moving attorneys in an already depressed economy. 
Amidst the excitement of the news that New York finally 
decided to join the forty-eight other states that had already 
adopted the format of the American Bar Association‟s (ABA) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,1 a close look revealed 
that, while the new Rules reflect a change in format, they are 
substantively not much different from the old Code.2 New 
 
  *   J.D., Pace University School of Law (expected May 2011); B.S. Hilbert 
College (2006). The Author would like to thank Professor Gary Munneke for 
his insight in this area, Matthew Collibee for his editing assistance, and Kyle 
Cavalieri for all of his support. 
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT Preface (2009) (“[T]he American 
Bar Association has provided leadership in legal ethics and professional 
responsibility through the adoption of professional standards that serve as 
models of the regulatory law governing the legal profession.”). 
2. Joan C. Rogers, New York Adopts Format of Model Rules, But Keeps 
1
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York‟s Rules are missing a few key provisions from the Model 
Rules, including one that allows laterally moving attorneys to 
be screened to avoid imputed disqualification. This provision is 
essential to attorneys changing employers in this economy. 
The legal profession and attorneys are not exempt from 
today‟s economy; the unemployment rates in Professional and 
Business Services are over ten percent.3 At a time when law 
firms are laying off lawyers, reducing partner pay, and 
deferring hiring due to the economy,4 it would be ideal to 
implement a lateral screening provision, eliminating one less 
burden for attorneys. Any restrictions on mobility under these 
current economic challenges, where a substantial number of 
lateral attorney moves are involuntary, are going to be 
extremely detrimental to the lawyer. In the United States, 
during the first three months of 2009, “more than 3,000 
lawyers lost their jobs due to downsizing and layoffs.”5 This 
news came following a sixty-six percent increase to a new ten-
year high of twenty thousand unemployed lawyers in 2008.6 
Even before the economic downturn, the rate of mobility among 
young lawyers was high, with fifty-three percent of lawyers 
changing practice settings between their second and seventh 
year of practice (2002 and 2007, respectively).7 “Regardless of 
whether lawyers move between private firms voluntarily or 
 
Much From Code and Omits MJP, 24 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. 
CONDUCT 666, Dec. 24, 2008. 
3. As of December 2009, the unemployment rate for Professional and 
Business Services was 10.3 percent. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC 
NEWS RELEASE; TABLE A-14: UNEMPLOYED PERSONS BY INDUSTRY AND CLASS OF 
WORKER, NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t14.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2010). 
4. See Cynthia Cotts, DLA Piper Lawyer Trades Big-Firm Perks for 
Boutique, BLOOMBERG, July 31, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqoEl_lhilg8. 
5. Cassandra Melton, Model Rule 1.10: Imputation of Conflicts and 
Private Law Firm Screening, PP&D (Sec. of Litig., A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), Fall 
2009, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/pretrial-model-
rule-110.html [hereinafter Melton, Imputation of Conflicts]. 
6. Id. 
7. Seven Years into a Lawyer’s Career, RESEARCHING LAW: AN ABF 
UPDATE (Am. B. Found., Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2009, at 3. When asked about 
their plans for the future, 32.7 percent of young lawyers reported that they 
planned to change practice settings within the next two years. Id. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
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involuntarily, such lawyers bring potential conflicts into new 
firms that hire them, which could disqualify entire law firms 
from representing clients. This increased movement 
underscores the need for a rule that reflects the realities of 
modern practice.”8 Unfortunately, New York‟s new Rules did 
not come equipped with a screening provision to aid laterally 
moving private attorneys in this regard. 
New York is not the only state struggling with the issue of 
lateral screening; the ABA just recently changed Model Rule 
1.10 to allow screening after numerous failed proposals.9 The 
ABA has been criticized for its stalled action in changing the 
rule to allow for screening in order to reflect the current status 
of the legal profession.10 At the time of the ABA‟s amendment, 
twenty-four states already had some form of lateral screening 
provision in place.11 Amended ABA Model Rule 1.10 allows for 
screening of a laterally-moving lawyer as long as the 
disqualified lawyer has no part in the matter, is given no part 
of the fee,12 and the affected former client is given prompt 
 
8. Melton, Imputation of Conflicts, supra note 5. 
9. The first proposal was submitted by the Ethics 2000 Committee in 
2002 and was rejected by a vote of 176-130. Robert Mundheim, General 
Information Form, in A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP. 
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 109, at 18 (2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/109.pdf. 
Then again in 2008, a similar recommendation was made to the House of 
Delegates who voted to postpone consideration of the Recommendation by a 
vote of 192-191. Id. Rule 1.10 was finally amended in February of 2009 by a 
vote of 226-191. Edward A. Adams, ABA House OKs Lateral Lawyer Ethics 
Rule Change, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 16, 2009, 4:04 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_house_oks_lateral_lawyer_ethic
s_rule_change/. 
10. See T. MAXFIELD BAHNER, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L 
RESPONSIBILITY, IT‟S TIME FOR THE ABA TO HAVE A SCREENING RULE (2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/bahner.pdf. “Our „Model‟ Rules of 
Professional Conduct are intended to be just that: a trusted model that the 
states of the union can follow in crafting their own rules of professional 
conduct.” Id. 
11. A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, LATERAL LAWYER 
SCREENING STATUS (2009), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/screen-status.pdf. 
12. Some states have removed the prohibition on fee sharing allowing 
the disqualified lawyer to receive a normal salary or distribution, including a 
part of the fee from the screened matter, stating that “attempting to preclude 
fee sharing . . . is impractical, particularly in large firms.” Douglas J. 
Brocker, The Expansion of Attorney Conflict Screening, N.C. ST. B.J., 
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/eth_articles_8,4.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2010). 
3
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written notice and certifications of compliance.13 
This Article offers a brief introduction on the use of 
screening and discusses the main arguments for and against 
allowing non-consensual lateral screening, including 
identification of the multiple situations where the New York 
Rules currently allow screening and discusses the evolution of 
screening through decisions from the state and federal courts 
deciding on motions to disqualify counsel (commonly favoring 
screening over imputed disqualification). The Article then 
addresses the trend in the legal profession towards uniform 
ethics standards through the teaching and examination of law 
students on the Model Rules. Finally, this Article recommends 
that New York adopt a provision in Rule 1.10 allowing lateral 
screening, similar to that of the Model Rules, setting forth key 
factors and definitions to be considered and included in the 
updated Rule. 
 
II.  Screening—the What, Why, and How 
 
Generally, when evaluating a lateral hire, the hiring firm 
will generate a list of the current matters that it has against 
the prospective employee‟s old firm, and will consult with each 
lawyer regarding any matter that might be adverse.14 Before 
making an offer of employment, a firm will ask a candidate to 
supply a list of the clients and cases that she has worked on 
(noting whether the clients will also be coming to the firm) or 
was substantially involved in (where it is foreseeable that the 
client might object to the new firm taking an adverse position 
to them).15 The new firm should cross-check the candidate‟s list 
against their own database, as well as require each lawyer of 
the firm to check the list for any potential conflicts.16 Often, 
lateral hires will be abandoned because the conflicts of interest 
are too problematic.17 
 
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a)(2)(i)-(iii) (2009). 
14. Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of 
Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 251-
52 (2003) [hereinafter Bushwhacking]. 
15. Id. at 252. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
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Screening is a term used to signify barriers created inside 
a law firm to isolate a conflicted attorney from the rest of the 
firm.18 The procedure allows a different attorney in the law 
firm to represent a client even though another attorney in the 
same firm is disqualified due to a conflict of interest.19 The 
primary goal of screening is to make sure that confidential 
information in the possession of the disqualified attorney 
remains protected.20 A private attorney moving laterally from 
one firm to another inevitably brings confidential information 
and potential conflicts. Allowing screening as an alternative to 
imputed disqualification of the entire firm gives clients more 
freedom to choose attorneys, allows lawyers greater flexibility 
in moving among employment situations, and permits law 
firms to hire experienced attorneys without the risk of imputed 
conflicts.21 
The ABA defines “screened” as the “isolation of a lawyer 
from any participation in a matter through the timely 
imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably 
adequate under the circumstances to protect information that 
the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or 
other law.”22 The Comments to Rule 1.0 set forth additional 
information and guidelines as to what the law firm should do to 
effectively screen a lawyer. The Comment states that in order 
to insure client confidentiality: 
 
[t]he personally disqualified lawyer should 
acknowledge the obligation not to communicate 
with any of the other lawyers in the firm with 
respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in 
the firm who are working on the matter should 
be informed that the screening is in place and 
that they may not communicate with the 
personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the 
matter. . . . To implement, reinforce and remind 
all affected lawyers of the presence of the 
 
18. See Brocker, supra note 12. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.0(k) (2009). 
5
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screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to 
undertake such procedures as a written 
undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any 
communication with other firm personnel and 
any contact with any firm files or other materials 
relating to the matter, . . . denial of access by the 
screened lawyer to firm files or other materials 
relating to the matter and periodic reminders of 
the screen to the screened lawyer and all other 
firm personnel. 
In order to be effective, screening measures 
must be implemented as soon as practical after a 
lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should 
know that there is a need for screening.23 
 
Although the amended Rule is not restricted to certain 
situations in lateral moves,24 the Rule does set forth “stringent 
requirements” that must be followed in order for the screen to 
be effective and the imputation of conflicts avoided.25 One half 
of the states with screening provisions in place have “limited” 
screens where the use of screening is not allowed in situations 
when the disqualified attorney had a “substantial role” in the 
former matter or when the present matter is “substantially 
related” to the former matter.26 In contrast, New York Rule 
1.10 does not allow for any non-consensual screening for 
laterally moving lawyers.27 
It seems ironic that New York State, having the largest 
population of attorneys (over 153,000),28 took twenty-six years 
 
23. Id. R. 1.0 cmts. 9-10 (2009). 
24. In August of 2009, the ABA amended Rule 1.10 to clarify the 
language of the Rule explicitly stating that non-consensual screening is only 
applicable in situations where a lawyer moves from one firm to another. 
ROBERT MUNDHEIM, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP. 
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 109 (2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/revision_to_rule_1_10.doc. 
25. Melton, Imputation of Conflicts, supra note 5. 
26. STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON & ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION 
OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 147-51 (2009). 
27. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)-(d) (2010). 
28. A.B.A. MKT. RES. DEP‟T, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE 
(2009), 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
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to get in line with the rest of the country and adopt the Model 
Rules, effective April 1, 2009.29 After taking a close look at New 
York‟s new Rules, it is nothing short of shocking that 
approximately “three-quarters of the new rules embody” the 
then current state code.30 Unfortunately, New York‟s Rule 1.10 
does not allow for screening of a laterally moving lawyer; it 
states that an attorney‟s new firm may not represent a client in 
the same or substantially related matter in which the lawyer or 
lawyer‟s prior firm represented the client, unless the individual 
did not acquire any information protected under Rule 1.6 or 
Rule 1.9 that is material to the matter.31 The rule does provide 
that the conflict can be waived by the former client under the 
conditions stated in Rule 1.7.32 Under this New York Rule, the 
use of screening to avoid imputed disqualification of laterally 
moving attorneys is not allowed. Although adoption of the 
Model Rules format is a step in the right direction, “there is 
still work to be done.”33 
 
III.  Attorney vs. Client—Is this the Real Conflict of 
Interest? 
 
The duty of confidentiality owed to current, former, and 
potential clients has no “statute of limitations”; it continues 
long after the lawyer-client relationship has ended.34 This duty 
 
http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/2009_NATL_LAWY
ER _by_State.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION]. 
29. Joel Stashenko, N.Y. Adopts New Conduct Rules Aligned with ABA 
Model, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202426814836 
[hereinafter New Conduct Rules]. 
30. Id. 
31. N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2010). Rule 1.6 protects 
the confidentiality of all information relating to the representation of the 
client and Rule 1.9 extends that duty to former clients and also states that a 
lawyer shall not use the confidential information to the disadvantage of the 
former client. Id. RR. 1.6, 1.9. 
32. Id. R. 1.10(d). Rule 1.7 allows representation with the existence of a 
conflict if: (1) the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation, (2) it is not prohibited by law, (3) it does not involve one client 
asserting a claim against another client, and (4) each affected client must 
give informed consent. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4). 
33. New Conduct Rules, supra note 29. 
34. Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 107. 
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produces a long list of clients whose interests must be weighed 
in a conflict of interest analysis, including many that are 
“remote, unlikely, or [even] forgotten.”35 The more clients that 
law firms owe fiduciary responsibilities to, the greater the 
likelihood of conflicts, thus creating a severe risk for large 
firms.36 “As lawyers navigate through the job market . . . from 
firm to firm, they accumulate weightier and weightier baggage 
that collects duties owed to each cohort of former and current 
clients they encounter.”37 Under imputed disqualification rules, 
migratory lawyers become so-called “Typhoid Marys, 
conflicting out thousands of their colleagues and forcing their 
new firms to turn away a substantial amount of prospective 
business” due to their prior affiliations.38 
Perhaps the biggest fear of those in opposition of lateral 
non-consensual screening is that it endorses “side switching,” 
allowing a lawyer who has represented a party on one side of 
litigation to then represent the opposing side by moving to a 
new firm.39 It is often argued that, before the screening 
amendment, clients had the security in knowing that a “side-
switching” lawyer and that attorney‟s new firm would be 
prevented from representing the other side if the former client 
withheld consent.40 This argument really focuses on clients‟ 
fear that attorneys are putting their own interests before those 
of their clients. The opposition argues that the fiduciary duties 
of loyalty and confidentiality are the “heart of the lawyer-client 
relationship” and the imputation of conflicts protects clients, 
which is the very purpose of the Model Rules.41 
The arguments criticizing screening as allowing “side-
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 108. 
38. Id. at 156. 
39. STEVEN C. KRANE, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, 
REP. (2008), http://www.aprl.net/pdf/SCEPR_Report.pdf. 
40. See Susan R. Martyn & James M. McCauley, Minority Report, in 
A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP. TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 109, at 16 (2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/109.pdf. 
41. Robert Rothman, Rule 1.10 Report, in A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & 
PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 
110, at 2 (2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/110.pdf. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
472 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
switching” are misguided, as is the false and misleading choice 
of whether to protect the client‟s interest of confidentiality or 
the personal interests of the lawyer. “Screening is a mechanism 
to give effect to the duty of confidentiality, not a tool to 
undermine it.”42 “Side switching” is not an issue with screening 
since the disqualified lawyer may never represent the opposing 
party by changing firms.43 Furthermore, “[t]he point of 
screening is to isolate that lawyer from participation in or 
communications about the matter, underscoring that the 
transferring lawyer is disqualified from „switching sides.‟”44 
A study of lawyers and law firms in Illinois, a jurisdiction 
that allows for lateral screening of private attorneys, revealed 
that law firms were not overwhelmed with screens.45 The 
screens are “constructed most frequently where they are most 
appropriate—in large law firms where conflicts are more 
common and confidentiality easier to cloister, especially where 
conflicts span physical, social, or geographic distance within 
the firm.”46 Although Illinois does not require client consent to 
screening, lawyers have reported that they are unlikely to use 
screening if it would not satisfy clients‟ expectations of 
undivided loyalty.47 Screening does not allow lawyers to 
undertake adverse representations; many times migratory 
lawyers must leave behind significant clients whose interests 
are adverse to those of the new firm.48 
Under a rule requiring consent, such as New York‟s, the 
client of the former firm holds the “sword of an absolute veto 
over his adversary‟s choice of law firm, simply by withholding 
consent, often solely for unfair tactical advantage without any 
 
42. Robert H. Mundheim, Report, in ADOPTED RECOMMENDATION 109, at 
11 (2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/daily_journal/Adopted109.do
c. 
43. Id. at 13. 
44. Id. The purpose of the screening amendment “is to avoid imputed 
disqualification of all the other lawyers in the new firm, lawyers who have 
not changed sides at all.” Id. 
45. Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 160. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
9
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substantive basis in fairness.”49 This type of rule “presumes the 
likelihood of lawyer dishonesty or negligence in violating a 
screen,” which reflects poorly on the legal profession and 
undermines the confidence and trust that lawyers strive to 
gain in the public eye.50 Although the interest of client 
confidentiality must be protected, doing so should not require a 
ban on the lawyer‟s mobility unless the client‟s consent is 
received.51 One important consideration is that former clients 
have no incentive to consenting, nor do they have any 
obligation not to withhold consent unreasonably.52 It follows 
that consent is rarely ever given under this system, although, 
when the screening judgment is left up to the attorney, as is 
the case in Illinois, screens are likely to be employed only in 
the appropriate situations. These restrictions on mobility affect 
not only the laterally moving lawyer, but also the interests of 
other clients in being represented by the attorney of their 
choice.53 
Recently, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 09-455, which 
discusses the issue of maintaining client confidentiality and 
disclosure related to conflict checking for lateral moves.54 The 
ABA quickly responded to concerns that the information a firm 
will need a laterally moving attorney to disclose, in order to 
complete a conflicts check, is protected from being disclosed 
under Rule 1.6(a).55 This opinion clarifies that while not 
explicitly stated in the Rules, disclosure of conflicts information 
during a lateral move is ordinarily permissible, subject to 
limitations.56 The opinion states that any disclosure should be 
“no greater than reasonably necessary” and “must not 
 
49. E. NORMAN VEASEY, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L 
RESPONSIBILITY, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO MODEL RULE 1.10 IS BALANCED 
AND IMPORTANT; THE ARGUMENTS OF THE OPPONENTS ARE STALE AND HOLLOW 1-
2 (2009), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/veasey.pdf. 
50. Id. at 1. 
51. Mundheim, supra note 42, at 11. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-455 
(2009) (discussing disclosure of Conflicts Information when Lawyers Move 
Between Firms). 
55. See id. 
56. Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
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compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice 
a client or former client[,] . . . [nor be used] for purposes other 
than detecting and resolving conflicts of interest. Disclosure 
normally should not occur until . . . substantive discussions” 
have taken place between the lawyer and the new firm.57 The 
opinion states that the rationale behind this opinion is to 
protect lawyer mobility and the clients‟ choice of legal counsel 
after a change of association.58 
 
IV.  New York Rules Allow Screening in Multiple 
Places 
 
Screening is not a stranger to the New York Rules, as it is 
currently allowed in three different situations: under Rule 1.11 
for government attorneys, under Rule 1.12 for judges, 
mediators, and non-lawyers, and under Rule 1.18 when dealing 
with prospective clients.59 One argument for allowing screening 
of laterally moving attorneys is that government attorneys can 
be screened when they move into private practice. However, 
criticisms have been raised concerning the question of why 
screening is allowed to protect the mobility of government 
lawyers, but then is not allowed to protect the livelihood of 
private lawyers.60 “Handicapping the ethics rules to encourage 
or favor one type of practice, however noble, is simply unfair.”61 
It has never been said that government lawyers are more 
ethical or trustworthy than private lawyers; therefore, if 
government lawyers can be trusted to comply with the 
screening regulations, then private lawyers should be trusted 
as well.62 
Rule 1.11, which addresses government attorneys, is the 
only Rule that provides an explanation for allowing screening, 
stating that the provisions are “necessary to prevent the 
disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent to 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT RR. 1.11, 1.12, 1.18 (2010). 
60. See ROBERT A. CREAMER, LATERAL SCREENING AFTER ETHICS 2000 
(2009), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/screen-ethics.pdf. 
61. Id. at 9. 
62. Id. at 10. 
11
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entering public service.”63 Under Rule 1.12, judges, mediators, 
arbitrators, and law clerks can be screened to avoid 
disqualification, but there is no rationale provided in the 
comments.64 Also, under Rule 1.18, lawyers who learn 
confidential information from a prospective client can be 
effectively screened to avoid imputation of conflict of interests 
to the entire firm and, again, no rationale is given for allowing 
screening in this circumstance.65 This Rule did not exist under 
the New York Code and was only recently adopted under the 
implementation of the Model Rules in April 2009. In adopting 
Rule 1.18, New York recognized the duty of confidentiality 
owed to perspective clients, realized the threat of potential 
conflicts that would be created, and mitigated this risk by 
allowing screening.66 The adoption of Rule 1.10, allowing for 
screening of laterally moving lawyers, would be a logical 
progression from here. 
Many critics are further bothered by New York‟s use of 
selective screening, as stated in the Comments under Rule 
1.10, to avoid imputation of conflicts from non-lawyers, 
specifically paralegals, legal secretaries, and law student 
interns.67 To discriminate between laterally moving private 
lawyers and non-lawyers is illogical.68 Why would a state allow 
non-lawyer employees to be screened to avoid imputation when 
they are under no personal professional duty to protect 
confidential client information and, at the same time, not allow 
screening of lawyers who are subject to these professional 
duties and who can be held personally responsible for their 
breach?69 To further complicate the situation, Rule 6.5 exempts 
“Limited Pro Bono Legal Services Programs” from Rule 1.10 
altogether, realizing that imputed conflicts can be a serious 
issue for many lawyers, but choosing to eradicate the problem 
for those serving in a pro bono program.70 New York will not 
 
63. N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.11 cmt. 4 (2010). 
64. Id. R. 1.12. 
65. Id. R. 1.18. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. R. 1.10 cmt. 4. 
68. CREAMER, supra note 65, at 10. 
69. See id. 
70. N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2010). Rule 6.5 states that a 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
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allow screening of lateral moving private attorneys, yet the 
state has granted exemptions for pro bono programs and made 
exceptions to protect government lawyers, judges, arbitrators, 
mediators, paralegals, law clerks, law secretaries, and lawyers 
when dealing with prospective clients. Conflicts of interest will 
arise at some point in every lawyer‟s career; it is not fair or just 
to protect only certain categories through exemptions or 
exceptions to screening, while not protecting others. 
 
V.  Effective Screening and Disqualification 
 
A.  Evolution of Screening in the Courts 
 
More than fifty years ago, Judge Weinfeld announced the 
“substantially related” standard for successive representation, 
which required the disqualification of an attorney even though 
it was not shown that the attorney was privy to the former 
client‟s confidences.71 Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) codified 
imputation of the disqualification to all of the lawyers affiliated 
with the disqualified lawyer.72 This Rule operated under the 
assumption that lawyers shared their client‟s confidential 
information with all of the other attorneys in the firm.73 
Perhaps this idea may have been more realistic when law firms 
were small and less specialized, but after concerns about 
lawyer mobility and the clients‟ right to an attorney of their 
choice, courts created a rebuttable presumption of imputed 
knowledge to avoid firm-wide disqualification in all cases.74 
 
lawyer “shall comply with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer has actual knowledge 
at the time of commencement of representation that another lawyer 
associated with the lawyer in the law firm is affected by Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 
1.9.” Id. R. 6.5(a)(2). 
71. See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
72. MODEL CODE OF PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1980). 
73. See The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. 
PA. L. REV. 677, 682 (1980) [hereinafter Chinese Wall Defense]. 
74. See generally Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that “it would be absurd to 
conclude that immediately upon their entry on duty [associates of large law 
firms] become the recipients of knowledge as to the names of all the firm‟s 
clients, the contents of all files relating to such clients, and all confidential 
disclosures by client officers or employees to any lawyer in the firm.”). 
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After the rebuttable presumption of imputed knowledge 
was accepted, the idea of using screening to avoid firm-wide 
disqualification began to have meaning.75 In 1975, the ABA 
Ethics Committee issued Formal Opinion 34276 endorsing the 
use of screening out of concern that inflexible application of 
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) would “unduly limit the 
employment opportunities of government attorneys upon 
leaving government service and impair the ability of 
government to recruit talented young professionals.”77 At that 
time, screening was not yet widely accepted because the then-
current Code of Conduct required lawyers to avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety under Canon 9.78 
The firm disqualification rule was perceived as serving 
dual purposes, preventing actual impropriety and also avoiding 
even the appearance of impropriety.79 “Only the first of these 
may fairly be characterized as ethical; the second is more of a 
matter of public policy.”80 Under this perception, when no 
actual impropriety existed, the firm could still be disqualified 
to avoid the appearance of impropriety as a matter of public 
policy.81 The idea of disqualification based on public policy left 
open the question of countervailing public policies such as 
lawyer mobility and a clients‟ right to their choice of lawyer. 
This argument became stronger when the ABA moved away 
from the Code and its appearance of impropriety standard, and 
adopted the Model Rules in 1983.82 Shortly thereafter, the 
Seventh Circuit decided the seminal case on the use of lateral 
screening in private practice. 
 
 
 
 
75. See Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 78, at 684. 
76. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 
(1975). 
77. Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 78, at 692. 
78. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980). 
79. Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 78, at 702. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See generally About the Model Rules, A.B.A., 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (last visited Sept. 15, 
2010). 
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B.  Judicial Interpretation of the Effectiveness of Screening 
 
In 1983, in Schiessle v. Stephens, the Seventh Circuit 
approved the idea of lateral screening in private practice and 
set forth an influential three-step test.83 The first two steps of 
the test determine whether an individual lawyer is disqualified 
from representation and the third step determines whether a 
disqualification will be imputed to the lawyer‟s new firm.84 The 
first step asks whether or not the subject matter of the prior 
representation and the subject matter of the present 
representation are substantially related; if so, the second step 
asks whether the presumption of shared confidences has been 
rebutted with respect to the prior representation.85 Finally, the 
third step asks whether the presumption of shared confidences 
has been rebutted with respect to the present representation.86 
“After Schiessle, many other federal courts have endorsed the 
use of screening to rebut the presumption of shared confidences 
when a lawyer switches from one private firm to another.”87 
While some state courts refuse to recognize screening as a 
mechanism to avoid imputed conflicts, some have adopted the 
three-part Schiessle test while others have taken an 
intermediate approach that allows for screening only under 
certain situations.88 New York case law falls under the latter 
category. Kassis v. Teacher’s Ins. & Annuity Ass’n is cited most 
often for finding screening effective to avoid imputed 
disqualification.89 In Kassis, the New York Court of Appeals 
refused to grant a motion to disqualify a laterally moving 
attorney that was previously a first-year associate at another 
 
83. 717 F.2d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1983). 
84. Conflicts of Interest; Imputed Disqualification, 51 ABA/BNA LAW. 
MANUAL ON PROF‟L CONDUCT 2001 (2004) [hereinafter Conflicts of Interest]. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. The fact that the federal courts do “articulate a vision of proper 
lawyering when they define the outer limits of an attorney‟s conduct under 
federal law, procedure, or rules of evidence” which have an important impact 
on state courts only further frustrates the goal of uniformity. Judith A. 
McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959, 
970 (1991). 
88. McMorrow, supra note 92. 
89. 717 N.E.2d 674 (N.Y. 1999). 
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firm.90 The court held that it would provide a tactical 
advantage to Kassis if Teacher‟s Insurance would incur 
significant financial hardship in retaining new counsel, and 
that the “Chinese Wall”91 that the new firm had erected was 
effective in screening the new attorney from any participation 
or discussions on the matter.92 The court stated that: 
 
[a] “per se rule of disqualification . . . is 
unnecessarily preclusive because it disqualifies 
all members of a law firm indiscriminately, 
whether or not they share knowledge of [the] 
former client‟s confidences and secrets . . . .” 
[B]ecause disqualification of a law firm during 
litigation may have significant adverse 
consequences to the client and others, “it is 
particularly important that the Code of 
Professional Responsibility not be mechanically 
applied . . . .”93 
 
Again in 2004, the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York approved of a law firm‟s use of screening.94 Even 
though a lawyer at Frommer Lawrence & Haug had worked at 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy as an associate three years 
earlier, and was listed as a recipient on e-mails regarding the 
present matter, the court held that disqualification was not 
required due to its use of an effective screen.95 More recently, in 
a situation involving a merger of firms, a district court judge in 
 
90. Id. 
91. The term “Chinese Wall” has not found favor among the legal 
community and is no longer widely accepted and used today due to criticisms 
of racial discrimination. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 
245 Cal. Rptr. 873, 887-88 (Ct. App. 1988) (Low, J., concurring). Terms used 
more often are ethical “screen” or “barrier of silence.” Id. 
92. See Kassis, 717 N.E.2d 674. 
93. Id. at 677 (citations omitted). 
94. See Papyrus Tech. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 
270, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
95. Id. The court analyzed this case under Kassis, the leading case on 
screening, finding no indication that the lawyer had received material 
information regarding the present case and that the screen was effective. Id. 
at 278-79. 
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the Eastern District of New York denied a motion to disqualify 
an entire firm on the basis that one of its attorneys had became 
disqualified because of the merger.96 The lawyer in Intelli-
Check had worked on a case while at the plaintiff‟s firm, 
Gibbons DelDeo, which he later left to join the firm of Kelley 
Drye, which was not involved with the case.97 Two years later, 
Kelley Drye merged with Collier Shannon, which represented 
the defendants, and the plaintiff moved for disqualification of 
the entire firm.98 The court denied the motion, finding that 
shortly after the merger, an effective screen was erected 
around the lawyer.99 The court noted that it was influenced by 
the fact that the conflicted lawyer was located in Kelley Drye‟s 
New York City office, while the litigation team representing 
the defendants was located in Washington, D.C.100 The New 
York courts have repeatedly used their discretion to approve of 
the use of screening, and thereby have avoided the harsh 
remedy of imputed disqualification, in the appropriate 
situations. 
 
C.  Disqualification Still an Available Remedy 
 
With the formulation and efficacy of a screen varying from 
firm to firm, courts will ultimately have to exercise their 
“inherent power to rule on a motion to disqualify.”101 “[C]ourts 
often consult the Model Rules and local rules for guidance, thus 
heightening the importance of devising standards that provide 
direction to attorneys as they seek to comply with their ethical 
responsibilities.”102 “Both the Rules and the courts have a role 
in preserving confidence in the integrity of the [legal] 
 
96. Intelli-Check, Inc. v. TriCom Card Techs., Inc., No. 03 CV 3706 (DLI) 
(ETB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84435 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008). 
97. Id. at *2-3. 
98. Id. at *1-3. 
99. Id. at *16. 
100. Id. at *8. The plaintiff argued that the lawyer‟s work was 
significant or “appreciable” and therefore screening should not be effective 
under Kassis. Id. at *14. The court refused to accept this argument stating 
that it was not going to pay attention to such labels. Id. at *15. 
101. Erik Wittman, A Discussion of Nonconsensual Screens as the ABA 
Votes to Amend Model Rule 1.10, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1211, 1221 (2009). 
102. Id. 
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profession” and therefore, while the Model Rules allow 
screening, they also explicitly state that a former client may 
still file a motion for disqualification where the court will be 
able to address their particular concerns with the 
representation.103 
It appears that, in effect, this is the very situation 
happening in New York; it only makes sense to conform our 
Rules to the modern realities of the legal profession. The 
requirements of screening are not to be taken lightly and 
compliance will have to be proven by the firm attempting to 
avoid the imputation of disqualification should the issue be 
brought before the court.104 On a motion for disqualification, a 
court is likely to consider multiple factors with regard to the 
screen, including: (1) the timeliness of invocation; (2) the 
procedures invoked to isolate the lawyer from the matter and 
all communications; (3) the time lapse between the matters in 
dispute; (4) the size of the firm; and (5) the firm‟s policy against 
breaches of a screen.105 
New York courts have made it clear that they do not have 
a problem with, and are very capable of, analyzing the use of 
screens and disqualifying a law firm when it appears 
necessary. In recent years, the courts have refused to disqualify 
entire law firms based on a laterally moving lawyer when: 1) 
she knew nothing about a certain case during her time at the 
prior firm,106 2) the prior client‟s allegations of the lawyer‟s 
possession of confidential information material to the 
representation were conclusory,107 and 3) she was being 
disqualified as part of a scheme to gain tactical advantage over 
the opponent.108 It should also be noted that the courts have 
 
103. See Mundheim, supra note 42. 
104. See Conflicts of Interest, supra note 89. 
105. Melton, Imputation of Conflicts, supra note 5. 
106. See generally Nimkoff v. Nimkoff, 797 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 2005); 
Telesco v. Bateau, 749 N.Y.S.2d 811 (App. Div. 2002). 
107. See generally Med. Capital Corp. v. MRI Global Imaging, Inc., 812 
N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. Div. 2006); Telesco, 749 N.Y.S.2d 811. 
108. See generally Kassis v. Teacher‟s Ins. & Annuity Ass‟n, 717 N.E.2d 
674 (N.Y. 1999); Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc., 470 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 
1984). One clear example of exploiting an imputed disqualification rule to 
gain tactical advantage is where law firms are known for a rare specialized 
expertise, such as the merger and acquisition specialists at Skadden, Arps, 
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not hesitated to disqualify firms where they have found the 
screen to be ineffective109 or the firm size too small.110 
The Rules must be clear for lawyers to be able to follow 
them and for law firms to be able to predict the results of their 
actions. In New York, there is no clear rule and the courts have 
taken it upon themselves to determine when screening will or 
will not be effective and when it is or is not allowed. The Rules 
of Professional Conduct are supposed to be a lawyer‟s guide to 
the practice of law in New York. The straight-forward “no” to 
lateral screening under Rule 1.10 will hardly suffice in today‟s 
economy, as is evident by the numerous court opinions and the 
actions of law firms that have implemented lateral screening 
on their own. 
While New York‟s Rules do not allow for lateral screening 
of private lawyers, courts have repeatedly ruled in favor of 
screening, finding the mechanism a favorable alternative to 
disqualification in situations where disqualifying the entire 
firm would be extremely detrimental to the law firm and its 
clients.. It is understandable that New York law firms and 
lawyers have received unclear messages about the use of 
screening; the Rules were adopted without a screening 
provision, yet the courts seem to be allowing screening in 
certain situations.111 It would be in the legal profession‟s best 
 
Slate, Meagher & Flom. See Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 114. When 
corporate executives feared that they may become potential takeover targets, 
they immunized themselves from a possible attack by a Skadden Arps client 
by giving the firm business and “thereby creating a direct adversity between 
their company and any potential client that might engage the firm to go after 
them.” Id. 
109. See generally Panebianco v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 04 Civ. 
9331 (JSR), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7314 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2005). 
110. See generally Young v. Cent. Square Cent. Sch. Dist., 213 F. Supp. 
2d 202 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Mitchell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 01 Civ. 2112 
(WHP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4675 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002); Decora, Inc. v. 
DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
111. “This lack of uniformity and clear distrust of lawyers‟ abilities to 
construct and respect screens directly conflicts with the goals and principles 
as stated in the ABA Model Rules. It is . . . these actions which undermine 
the integrity of the profession.” Erin A. Cohn, The Use of Screens to Cure 
Imputed Conflicts of Interest: Why the American Bar Association’s and Most 
State Bar Associations’ Failure to Allow Screening Undermines the Integrity 
of the Legal Profession, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 367, 393 (2006) [hereinafter Cohn, 
Use of Screens]. 
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interest if everyone were reading from the same page, ideally, 
of the New York Rules. If New York were to set forth a detailed 
screening provision in its Rules, law firms would know what to 
expect when confronting a situation involving a lateral private 
move and potential conflicts, and courts would also have 
guidelines to use in allowing screening as an alternative to 
imputed disqualification. 
 
VI.  Self Regulation and Uniform Standards 
 
The legal profession prides itself on being wholly self-
regulated. Indeed, self-regulation “is at the core of a viable 
legal profession.”112 It appears that the “privilege of self 
regulation could so easily drift towards the view that it is but 
an option, one that can be easily removed if not treated with 
the serious sense of purpose it deserves.”113 But query whether 
today‟s legal profession is wholly self-regulated. There has been 
much criticism on this issue and some argue that the ABA‟s 
Model Rules are “no longer . . . sufficient to foreclose other 
regulation . . . .”114 
It seems likely that uniformity among state ethics rules 
would strengthen the idea of self regulation. States that adopt 
the Model Rules have the benefit of common experience and 
persuasive authority through multiple sources. This includes 
opinions from other state courts, formal and informal opinions 
on the meaning and application of the Rules issued by the 
ABA‟s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, where the 
influence of the Model Rules is “heavy and readily apparent.”115 
 
112. Charles B. Plattsmier, Self Regulation and the Duty to Report 
Misconduct: Myth or Mainstay?, 2007 PROF. LAW. 41, 45. 
113. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
114. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1147, 1171 (2009) (arguing that “[a] variety of regulators external to the 
ABA—including the courts—interpret, adjust, and enforce the rules and 
provide their own regulations when the prevailing professional code seems 
inadequate”). 
115. Gregory C. Sisk, Iowa’s Legal Ethics Rules - It’s Time to Join the 
Crowd, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 279, 290 (1999). The Restatement was not designed 
to track any particular set of ethics rules but rather to “reflect the informed 
and deliberate consensus of the profession on professional conduct.” Id. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
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Uniform ethics standards would also be beneficial to lawyers 
that engage in multi-jurisdictional practice by allowing them 
the benefit of familiar rules. These benefits will not be shared 
in a state which adopts the Model Rules in format, though not 
in substance, as was done in New York. 
It seems that the legal profession is moving towards a 
trend of national ethics standards. Today, all American law 
schools that are accredited by the ABA “shall require that each 
student receive substantial instruction in . . . the history, goals, 
structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal 
profession and its members.”116 This includes “instruction in 
matters such as the law of lawyering and the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association.”117 If 
our law schools operate under a national accreditation system 
which mandates that every student receive substantial 
education under the Model Rules, it seems illogical and 
inefficient for a state to implement rules any different from 
those which every lawyer who attended an ABA accredited law 
school is familiar with. 
Furthermore, as a condition for admission to the bar in all 
but four U.S. jurisdictions, applicants must pass the Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).118 The 
purpose of the MPRE is to “measure the examinee‟s knowledge 
and understanding of established standards related to a 
lawyer‟s professional conduct.”119 The examination tests on the 
law governing the conduct of lawyers and “is based on the 
disciplinary rules of professional conduct currently articulated 
in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .”120 
Therefore, not only are law students subjected to substantial 
instruction based on the Model Rules, but they are also 
examined on the Model Rules as a condition to gain admittance 
 
116. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., 2009-2010 
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(5), 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2009-
2010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3 .pdf. 
117. Id. at Interpretation 302-9. 
118. Description of the MPRE, NAT‟L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM‟RS, 
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/mpre-faqs/description0/ (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2010). 
119. Id. (emphasis added). 
120. Id. 
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to the bar. The benefits of adopting rules in unison with the 
Model Rules are twofold; it saves resources for the state by 
eliminating the need to promulgate its own Rules, and it 
furthers the goals of self regulation of the legal profession when 
attorneys are educated on and proficient with the Rules. 
 
VII.  Recommendation 
 
New York has more attorneys than any other state.121 It 
should follow that the ethics rules for the state‟s legal 
profession would serve as a guide to other states, but 
unfortunately this is not the case. In an attempt to modernize 
the ethics rules, New York has taken a step in the right 
direction by adopting the Model Rules format, but it did not go 
far enough. New York should follow the example set forth in 
the Model Rules and allow lateral screening without 
limitations under Rule 1.10. 
Experience has shown that, even without limitations, 
screening has not been problematic in states that allow it and 
the courts have had no hesitation exercising their power in 
deciding on motions to disqualify.122 It does not make sense to 
forego a favorable alternative to firm-wide imputed 
disqualification when there is no showing that screening can 
not or should not be used in the appropriate situations. As seen 
through the survey of Illinois lawyers, screens are not being 
abused; they are being used in the appropriate situations.123 
Even when appropriate, firms will weigh the price of bringing 
on a new attorney with that of losing a client if the client is 
likely to disapprove of the screen.124 
Many states that have adopted rules allowing screening of 
lateral attorneys have further explained the rule and how it 
should be implemented, most commonly in the definitions 
 
121. NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION, supra note 28. 
122. Robert H. Mundheim, Report, in A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L 
RESPONSIBILITY, REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 109, at 
4-10 (2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/109.pdf. 
123. See Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 160. 
124. Id. 
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section and also in the Comments to the rule.125 One addition 
that should be adopted, in hopes to win favor among those in 
opposition, is a requirement that firms implement their own 
policy against breaches of the screen.126 The rule should go a 
step further, stating the wisdom of explicitly providing for 
imposition of court ordered sanctions where appropriate.127 A 
strong firm-wide policy against breaches will serve as a 
deterrent to violating a screen and, when coupled with the 
threat of sanctions, should prove sufficient in controlling the 
use of screens and ensuring that client confidentiality is 
protected. 
To make screening as effective as possible, New York 
should include in its Rule notice that implementation of the 
screen must be “timely.” Logically, the next step would be to 
define what will suffice as “timely.” There is no uniformity 
among the courts on this issue. Some courts have held that, in 
order for a screen to be effective, it must be implemented at the 
time the new attorney joins the firm.128 Recently in New York, 
a district court held that, even though a lateral lawyer knew of 
a conflict and did not disclose it, a screen implemented two 
days after opposing counsel demanded the firm withdraw from 
representation was considered “timely.”129 Although the Intelli 
court‟s method, which weighed the interests of both parties 
involved,130 is a sound approach to conflicts, a much stronger 
approach would be to provide a clear guideline in the Rules 
which would allow lawyers to mold their behavior accordingly. 
Thus, Rule 1.10 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct 
should contain a provision allowing for timely screening of 
laterally moving attorneys, a requirement for a strong firm 
policy against breaches, and the threat of court ordered 
sanctions, to sufficiently protect both the interest of the 
attorney in mobility and the client in maintaining 
 
125. See, e.g., N.C. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT RR. 1.0(l) cmt. 9-10 & 1.10 
cmt. 7-8 (2003). 
126. See generally Wittman, supra note 106, 1224-25. 
127. Id. 
128. See id. at 1225-26. 
129. Intelli-Check, Inc. v. TriCom Card Techs., Inc., No. 03 CV 3706 
(DLI) (ETB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84435, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008). 
130. See id. at *18. 
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confidentiality. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
“In a profession there should be certain ethical rules from 
which no derogation is allowed, and professionals in a position 
to create and amend these rules should strive for 
uniformity.”131 By not allowing lateral screening of private 
attorneys, New York is effectively saying that its private 
attorneys cannot be trusted. Although adopting the Model 
Rules in New York was one step towards modernization and 
uniformity, the movement has not come far enough. The 
substantive Rules are more important than their format and 
New York should aim to tailor its Rules as closely to the Model 
Rules as possible to take advantage of the benefits that come 
with uniformity. With more attorneys than any other state,132 
New York should be a leader in the profession, protecting 
clients and attorneys with rules modeled to reflect current 
issues being experienced in practice. 
We have all recently learned that the legal profession is 
not recession proof and New Yorkers know very well the tough 
job market that exists today. As a self-regulated profession, it 
is unacceptable that we are hindering our own lawyers from 
landing new jobs through the risk of firm-wide imputed 
disqualification created under our Rules.133 Knowing this, New 
York must reconsider Rule 1.10 in light of the recent steps 
towards modernizing the Rules of Conduct for the legal 
profession. Uniformity and consistency among the Rules 
encourages ethical behavior by ensuring that attorneys are 
educated and familiar with them. If New York wants its Rules 
to be worth their weight in paper, it must correlate with how 
the State‟s courts are ruling in light of this issue and how the 
situations addressed are playing out in the legal profession 
today. 
 
131. Cohn, Use of Screens, supra note 116, at 392. 
132. NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION, supra note 28. 
133. See generally N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)-(d) (2010); 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE; TABLE A-11: 
UNEMPLOYED PERSONS BY INDUSTRY AND CLASS OF WORKER, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t11.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2010). 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/9
